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Abstract
When Luce (1959) introduced his Choice Axiom, this raised immediate crit-
icism by Debreu (1960), pointing out inconsistencies when items are ranked
from inferior to superior (instead of ranking them from superior to infe-
rior). As recently shown by Breitmoser (2019), Luce’s Independence of Ir-
relevant Alternatives (IIA) is equivalent to Luce’s Choice Axiom when pos-
itivity holds. This fact seems to have escaped attention so far and might
suggest that Debreu’s critique also applies to the notion of IIA, which is
widely used in the literature. Furthermore, this notion could potentially be
intuitively misleading, as the consequences of this axiom seem to be different
than the name suggests. This might spill over to the intuitive interpretation
of theoretical results that build on this axiom.
This paper motivates the introduction of the notion of Independece of Alter-
natives (IoA) in the context of ranking models. IoA postulates a property
of independence which seems intuitively reasonable (as it exactly captures
what Luce himself describes when speaking about IIA), but does not exclu-
sively hold in models where Luce’s Choice Axiom applies. Assuming IoA,
expected ranks in the ranking of multiple alternatives can be determined
from pairwise comparisons. The result holds in many models which do not
satisfy IIA (e.g. certain Thurstone V models, Thurstone (1927)), can signif-
icantly simplify the calculation of expected ranks in practice and potentially
facilitate analytic methods that build on more general approaches to model
the ranking of multiple alternatives.
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1 Introduction
Luce’s Choice Axiom (LCA, Luce (1959)) is one of the strong axioms in the field
of ranking multiple alternatives. Breitmoser (2019) showed that, under the as-
sumption that Positivity holds, it is equivalent to the property of Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) introduced by Luce (1959) and restated by McFadden
(1973).1 Given the implications of LCA, which (among others) have been studied
by Yellott Jr (1977) and Allison and Christakis (1994), one might wonder whether,
in fact, the property of IIA could potentially be different from what its intuitive
meaning suggests. On the one hand, one might wonder about the meaning of ”ir-
relevant” in models where positivity holds. Furthermore, ”independence” could
potentially be interpreted differently, as Debreu’s critique (Debreu, 1960) extends
from LCA to IIA.
Consider the following situation for illustration. A government tries to aggre-
gate voters’ opinions in order to choose from different policies, but not all policies
are available at all times. Now, one could ask whether the relative order of two
policies depends on the availability of other policies. When Luce motivates IIA
(Luce (1959), p. 9), he intuitively describes it as follows:
”The idea states that if one is comparing two alternatives according to some
algebraic criterion, say preference, this comparison should be unaffected by the ad-
dition of alternatives or the subtraction of old ones (different from the two under
consideration).”2
If the government assumes that this idea is reasonable, it might infer that IIA
and (given positivity) LCA hold in this situation. In the opinion of the author,
this is questionable, as IIA and LCA do not capture the intution described above.
On the one hand, imagine the government would set up a simple urn model
1Note that Luce in his original work showed that LCA and Positivity imply IIA, but did not
show equivalence.
2Luce then argues that the ”probabilistic analogue of this idea is not perfectly clear”, and
proposes to translate it as constant ratios of the probabilities to be ranked first.
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to produce the ranking of policies. Let us assume that policies are represented by
colors, with blue and red balls in the urn, and the number of blue and red balls
determines the chance of one color being drawn first. The order in which the colors
are drawn determine their ranking. Now, we can also add additional black balls to
the urn, keeping the blue and red balls constant. In this situation LCA holds, as
the ratio of blue and red balls in the urn does not change. Now imagine that we
change the rules slightly, introducing that the ball which is drawn first is actually
ranked last, the next distinct color drawn is ranked second-to-last and so on. This
obviously changes the probabilities to be ranked first (which corresponds to being
drawn third in this example) and, for any case of more than two colors, LCA (as
well as IIA) is violated.3 However, it is not straightforward to see why this model
should violate ”independence”, as we do not change the composition of the urn
with respect to blue and red balls while adding black balls.
On the other hand, note that IIA only imposes conditions on probabilities to
rank first. Specifically, assume that policies X and Y are among the alternatives
to be ranked, and X will be ranked either first or second, if Y is in the set to be
ranked. At the same time X will rank either first or last, if Y is not in the set. In
the light of Luce’s description, it might seem unintuitive to say that the situation
described can satisfy IIA, as the relative ranking of X and a third option, say Z,
seems to depend on whether Y is to be ranked or not. Yet, a situation like this is
not excluded by IIA, see the following example:
Example 1. Let rankings be denoted by vectors, i.e. (A,B,C,D) implies item A is
ranked first, B second, and so on. Let C = {W,X, Y, Z}. Now, define the following
probabilities on rankings:
PrC ((W,X, Y, Z)) = PrC ((X, Y,W,Z)) =
PrC ((Y,X,W,Z)) = PrC ((Z,X, Y,W )) = 0.25
3Instead, a modified version holds, where the probability ratios of being ranked last are con-
stant across different sets. This modified version was discussed by Luce himself, see Theorem 8
of Luce (1959).
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Note that X is ranked either first or second, while all elements have an equal chance
to end up first. In sets of three alternatives, define
PrC\{Z} ((W,X, Y )) = PrC\{Z} ((X, Y,W )) = PrC\{Z} ((Y,X,W )) =
1
3
PrC\{Y } ((W,Z,X)) = PrC\{Y } ((X,Z,W )) = PrC\{Y } ((Z,W,X)) =
1
3
PrC\{X} ((W,Z, Y )) = PrC\{X} ((Z, Y,W )) = PrC\{X} ((Y, Z,W )) =
1
3
PrC\{W} ((Z,X, Y )) = PrC\{W} ((X, Y, Z)) = PrC\{W} ((Y,X,Z)) =
1
3
Again, all elements have an equal chance to end up first. However, X is exclusively
ranked first or second, if Y is in the set. In the situation where Y is missing, X
ends up either first or last. Finally, assume that in all pairwise comparisons, all
items have equal probabilities of 0.5.
It is straightforward to see that probabilities to rank first are equal for all
alternatives in any subset of C (i.e., constant probability ratios of exactly one).
Therefore, IIA as introduced by Luce formally holds, while the situation might
violate what Luce expresses to be his intuition of IIA.
In this paper, I propose the property of ”Indepence of Alternatives” (IoA). It
attempts to capture Luce’s intuition, while providing structure that can potentially
be beneficial in determining expected ranks of alternatives. Imagine the government
wants to aggregate the rankings of available policies applying the “Rule of Borda”.
Assuming IoA, it can take a shortcut in ranking policies. Instead of eliciting full
rankings of every voter and applying the rule, it is sufficient to know the proportion
of voters that favors one policy over another in pairwise comparisons.
Note that other authors have promoted different notions of independence in the
context of stochastic choice. Yet, IoA differs from ”i-independence” introduced by
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) and ”independence” introduced by Gul, Natenzon,
and Pesendorfer (2014). In this comparison, one might say that IoA is an axiom
in the context of stochastic ranking rather than stochastic choice, as it does not
(directly) impose restrictions on probabilities to be chosen, but to be ranked better.
While stochastic choice and IIA helps to answer the question “Which alternative
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is the best?”, stochastic ranking rather addresses the question “Which alternative
is better?”.
Given that IoA holds, I present a result to determine the expected rank of an
item in the ranking of n alternatives from only pairwise comparisons. It relates
to results by Luce (1959) and McFadden (1973), who established a similar link
for LCA and IIA models, namely that the probability to be ranked first in any
set can be inferred from pairwise comparisons. The differences of these results
might become apparent when considering them in the context of chess ratings, see
Chapter 3 for details.
The next chapter introduces mathematical properties associated with the rank-
ing of n alternatives and describes their mutual relations. Chapter 3 derives the
result for expected ranks and discusses its implications, and Chapter 4 concludes.
2 Mathematical properties of rankings
2.1 Notation
This paper studies rankings of multiple alternatives. Note that ties are excluded
in these rankings. To fix notation, let
 C be a finite set of n objects,
 Σ be the power set of C,
 (Ω,A,P) be a general abstract probability space.
Now, consider a family of rankings {rS}S∈Σ on subsets of C (as S ∈ Σ). Rank-
ings are random variables on Ω:
rS : S × Ω→ N
for all S ∈ Σ.
Example 2. Define Ω = {ω1, ω2} and C = {x, y, z}. Now, define the rankings
according to Table 1.
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rC(c, ω) r{x,y}(c, ω)
x y z x y
ω1 1 2 3 ω1 1 2
ω2 3 1 2 ω2 2 1
r{x,z}(c, ω) r{y,z}(c, ω)
x z y z
ω1 2 1 ω1 1 2
ω2 2 1 ω2 2 1
Table 1: Ranking example
In this example, rC(z, ω) > 1 ∀ ω ∈ Ω, i.e. alternative z is never ranked first
when ranking the set C (but it will always be ranked first when ranking {x, z}).
Note that this notation allows to formulate the probability for item c ∈ C to
be ranked at position i when ranking the set S, i.e.
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(c, ω)= i}) .
2.2 Properties
The mathematical foundation of ranking models has a long history in different fields
of science. Thurstone (1927) established a framework, which was later refined and
extended by other researchers. The so-called Thurstone V models4 represent a class
of models in which items create a stochastic stimulus and are ranked accordingly.
When correlation is set to zero, the stimulus is drawn independently from identical
distributions, which only differ about their mean, see Figure 1 for an example.
Bradley and Terry (1952) established a Thurstone V model with underlying
extreme value distributions, which is the foundation of logit analysis known today.
While the authors focus on pairwise comparisons, this approach was extended by
4The Roman number V is a numeration of increasingly structured models.
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Figure 1: Thurstone V model, where stimuli of items S1, S2 and S3 are drawn from
normal distributions that differ about their mean. Subsequently, items are ranked
according to their stimuli.
Luce (1959) for rankings of n alternatives. In this work, he postulated what is
today known as Luce’s Choice Axiom,
pS(x) =
pC(x)∑
y∈S pC(y)
. (1)
Here, pS(x) denotes the probability of item x being ranked first when the set S is
to be ranked,
pS(x) = P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)=1})
Intuitively speaking, LCA demands that the probability of being ranked first
in a set equals the share of winning probabilities in the entire world. Note that it
is crucial to define the relation on the probabilities to be ranked first. Reversing
Luce’s Choice Axiom in a way that ”the probabilities of being ranked last in a set
are caclulated using the probabilities of being last in the complete set of items”
is a different assumption, and Luce himself proved that there is no distribution
satisfying both his Choice Axiom and the ”Reversed Choice Axiom” (see Luce
(1959)).
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Furthermore, he introduced the property of Positivity which is defined as
pS(x) > 0 ∀S⊆C, ∀x∈S. (2)
and states that each item has a positive probability to be chosen in any given
choice set. Actually, one might be inclined to say that this property rules out the
existence of any ”irrelevant” option in any set. Specifically, as Luce (1959) pointed
out himself, in any situation where LCA holds, pS(x) = 0 for arbitrary S means
that item x is never chosen in any set and could thus be eliminated.
Finally, Luce (1959) introduced the property of Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives (IIA) which, under the assumption of positivity, is formulated as
pS(x)
pS(y)
=
pS′(x)
pS′(y)
∀S, S ′⊆C, ∀x, y∈S ∩ S ′. (3)
Intuitively speaking, it states that the ratio of probabilities to be ranked first is
constant for any two items in any two sets which contain both elements. It turns
out that
Lemma 1. The property of IIA is equivalent to Luce’s Choice Axiom under the
assumption of positivity.
For a proof, see Breitmoser (2019). An alternative proof is provided in Appendix
5.1.
In the following, a novel independence property is defined. The property of Inde-
pendence of Alternatives (IoA) assumes a certain structure on rankings, specifically
on the probability of item x receiving a better rank than item y when ranking al-
ternatives of the set S with x, y∈S. IoA states that this probability is independent
of S.
Definition 2.1. A model satisfies Independence of Alternatives if, for all S, S ′ ∈ Σ
and all x, y ∈ S ∩ S ′,
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)<rS(y, ω)}) = P ({ω∈Ω | rS′(x, ω)<rS′(y, ω)}) .
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Note that IoA and IIA are technically very different properties, as none implies
the other. While IIA imposes a certain structure exclusively on probabilities to
be ranked first, IoA relaxes this structure on rank one probabilities5, but at the
same time imposes additional structure on rank two to n. A simple example which
satisfies IIA, but not IoA, as well as some further remarks can be found in section
2.3.
2.3 Relation between IIA and IoA
In order to see that IIA does not imply IoA, consider the following
Example 3. Assume that the three alternatives S = {A,B,C} are to be ranked.
In pairwise comparisons, A is twice as likely to be first when compared to B or C,
i.e.
p{A,B}(A) = P
({ω∈Ω | r{A,B}(A, ω)<r{A,B}(B,ω)}) = 2
3
,
p{A,C}(A) = P
({ω∈Ω | r{A,C}(A, ω)<r{A,C}(C, ω)}) = 2
3
.
In the comparison of B and C, both alternatives are equally likely to be first. Now,
in the rating of all three alternatives, assume that
pS(A) = P ({ω∈Ω |rS(A, ω)=1, rS(B,ω)=2, rS(C, ω)=3}) = 0.5,
pS(B) = P ({ω∈Ω |rS(B,ω)=1, rS(A, ω)=2, rS(C, ω)=3}) = 0.25,
pS(C) = P ({ω∈Ω |rS(C, ω)=1, rS(A, ω)=2, rS(B,ω)=3}) = 0.25.
One can easily verify that IIA holds, as A is still twice as likely to be first. On the
other hand,
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(A, ω)<rS(B,ω)}) = pS(A) + pS(C) = 0.75,
which is inconsistent with the pairwise comparison of A and B.
5Consider, for example, the urn models in Chapter 1, which obviously satisfy IoA, while one
of them does not satisfy IIA (Luce, 1959).
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This example discloses what IIA lacks in order to imply IoA: an extension of
its (strong) structure of probabilities for ranking first to the probabilities of other
ranks. If additional structure is assumed, for example, probabilities to rank second
being connected to the probabilities to rank first, IIA can imply IoA. One way of
achieving this is by introducing Order Consistency (OC). To my knowledge, this
axiom is new in the context of stochastic rankings.
Definition 2.2. A model satisfies Order Consistency if ∀S⊆C, ∀i, j∈S:
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)=1, rS(y, ω)=2}) = P
({ω∈Ω | rS\{x}(y, ω)=1}) .
Intuitively speaking, OC means that there is no information to be gained about
the ranking of other alternatives by observing the best option, i.e. correlation is
set to zero. Now, it can be shown that
Lemma 2. Together, the properties of IIA and OC imply IoA.
For a proof, see Appendix 5.2. Note that OC is not a necessary condition for
IoA to hold, i.e. one can find examples of four or more alternatives where IIA and
IoA hold, but OC does not.
One might be inclined to generalize OC in a way that observing any rank does
not change ranking probabilities of the other alternatives, i.e. ∀S⊆C, ∀i, j∈S :
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)= i, rS(y, ω)=j}) =
P
({ω∈Ω | rS\{x}(y, ω)=j−1}) if i<j
P
({ω∈Ω | rS\{x}(y, ω)=j}) if j<i
(4)
However, while this property might be intuitively intriguing, note that there is no
model that can satisfy it (other than trivial models, where all alternatives have
an equal chance in every set). The argument is as follows: property (4) implies
both OC and IoA6, hence LCA. At the same time, it implies “reversed OC”, which
together with IoA implies “reversed LCA”. Thus, no non-trivial model can satisfy
6See Appendix 5.3 for a formal proof.
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(4). One might say that this property is equivalent to generalizing Luce’s axiom,
extending it to probabilities for any rank, which is known not to be feasible.
The next section derives a result which holds solely under the assumption of
IoA.
3 Expected ranks from pairwise comparisons
The property of IoA in ranking models yields a relation between expected ranks
in pairwise comparisons and expected ranks in sets of multiple alternatives. Let
S be a set of k items to be ranked, i.e. |S| = k. Furthermore let (Ω,A,P) be a
general abstract probability space. Now, continue by defining the following random
variables. Let XˆSx,y(ω) : Ω→ {0, 1} denote the random variable which (in state ω)
yields a one if, in the overall ranking, x is ranked better than y, and zero otherwise.
XˆSx,y(ω) =
1 for rS(x, ω)<rS(y, ω)0 otherwise
In addition, let Y Sx (ω) : Ω→ {0, 1, ..., k − 1} be the random variable given by
Y Sx (ω) =
∑
y∈S
y 6=x
XˆSx,y(ω),
i.e. the random variable that states how many items have a higher rank than item
x. Finally, recall that rS(x, ω) denotes the rank of x.
Remark 1. The rank rS(x, ω) of item x when ranking set S equals (by definition)
the difference between the total number of items and the number of items which are
ranked higher than x, namely Y Sx (ω):
rS(x, ω) = k − Y Sx (ω) (5)
Now, under the assumption of IoA, one can consider Xˆ
{x,y}
x,y (ω), i.e. the random
variable which yields a one if x is ranked better than y in the set S = {x, y} (i.e.,
in the pairwise comparison of x and y) and claim that
P
(
XˆSx,y(ω)=1
)
(IoA)
= P
(
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)=1
)
(6)
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From here, a link in expectation can be established, connecting the number of items
that have a higher rank than x to the probabilities of pairwise comparison.
Lemma 3.
E
[
Y Sx (ω)
]
=
k∑
y=1
y 6=x
P
(
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)=1
)
. (7)
Proof. By definition, it holds that
E
[
Y Sx (ω)
]
= E
 k∑
y=1
y 6=x
XˆSx,y(ω)
 .
Now, by (6) and noting that probabilities imply expected values, it holds that
E
 k∑
y=1
y 6=x
XˆSx,y(ω)
 = E
 k∑
y=1
y 6=x
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)

and subsequently,
E
 k∑
y=1
y 6=x
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)
 = k∑
y=1
y 6=x
E
[
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)
]
=
k∑
y=1
y 6=x
P
(
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)=1
)
.
Combining (5) and (7) yields the following
Theorem 1. Under IoA, the expected rank of item i in the ranking of k alternatives
is determined by it’s pairwise comparisons with all other alternatives, i.e.
E [rS(x, ω)] = k −
k∑
j=1
j 6=i
P
(
Xˆ{x,y}x,y (ω)=1
)
.
The value of this relation lies in its connection between pairwise comparison
and ranking of k > 2 items. The left-hand-side corresponds to
E[rS(x, ω)] =
k∑
j=1
j · P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)=j})
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where P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)=j}) might be remarkably more complex to calculate.
The differences between the concepts and implications of IIA and IoA might
best become apparent when considering chess ratings. Both the United States
Chess Federation (USCF) and the Fe´de´ration Internationale des E´checs (FIDE) use
rating systems to measure the strength of players and to predict outcomes. Notably,
their formulas to calculate predictions differ. The USCF formulas correspond to
a Thurstone V model with underlying extreme value distributions. On the other
hand, FIDE assumes a Thurstone V model with underlying normal distributions.
Yellott Jr (1977) shows that LCA (and therefore IIA) hold in the former, but not
in the latter. Now, consider a chess tournament with multiple players. According
to the results of Luce (1959) and McFadden (1973), one can infer the winning
probabilities of the whole tournament from pairwise comparisons in the USCF
system, but not in the FIDE system. On the other hand, as IoA holds, expected
ranks can be derived from pairwise comparisons in both systems.
4 Conclusion
This paper motivates to consider the notion of IoA, which in some sense might
seem competing with the notion of IIA. However, while their semantic appearance
is similar, their formal definitions as well as their implications differ significantly.
Debreu’s critique about LCA and the recently discovered link between IIA and
LCA demands for a closer re-evaluation. Intuitively speaking, one might wonder
why random utility models such as Thurstone V as well as certain urn models
would violate IIA. Potentially it could be fair to say that models which keep the
stimulus of items constant (independent from other alternatives in the choice set),
or models in which the reversed LCA holds, satisfy some independence property.
The notion of IoA is in line with Luce’s intuitive description of independence and
could fix this issue, while at the same time allowing a cleaner interpretation of
models that do or do not satisfy an independence property. In applications (such
as chess tournaments), one might wonder whether some independence property
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holds, i.e. whether the level of performance is unaffected by other players who
might or might not participate in the tournament. While there potentially can
be arguements both for and against this property, it seems unintuitive to say that
independence of irrelevant alternatives could hold in the USCF system, but (by
definition) not in the FIDE system. As IoA holds in both, this issue does not exist
when discussing independence of alternatives in chess tournaments.
In addition, this paper shows that, under the assumption of IoA, expected ranks
can be determined solely from pairwise comparisons. This result holds specifically,
but not exclusively, for Luce’s model with underlying extreme value distributions.
It constitutes a shortcut to calculate expected ranks in practice when the standard
way of calculation could be significantly more cumbersome. The benefits of cal-
culating expected ranks from pairwise comparisons might also simplify situations
in which the comparison of multiple alternatives is significantly more difficult to
comprehend.
13
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, note that positivity is necessary to guarantee that probability ratios
are well-defined, i.e. none of the denominators is zero. Assuming that Luce’s
Choice Axiom (1) holds,
pS(x)
pS(y)
(1)
=
pC(x)∑
z∈S pC(z)
pC(y)∑
z∈S pC(z)
=
pC(x)
pC(y)
=
pC(x)∑
z∈S′ pC(z)
pC(y)∑
z∈S′ pC(z)
(1)
=
pS′(x)
pS′(y)
.
On the other hand, assuming that IIA (3) holds and taking S ′ = C yields
pS(x) = pC(x) · pS(y)
pC(y)
. (8)
Summing (8) over all x ∈ S yields∑
x∈S
pS(x) = 1 =
pS(y)
pC(y)
∑
x∈S
pC(x)
and therefore,
pS(y) =
pC(y)∑
x∈S pC(x)
.

5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume IIA and OC hold and show that IoA holds by induction over |S|.
Obviously, if |S| = 2, IoA holds. Now, assume it holds for |S| = n. Consider a
set with n + 1 alternatives, and rank one option to be in first place. This leads to
three cases:
(i) x is ranked first
(ii) y is ranked first
(iii) some z different from x, y is ranked first
14
Consider cases (i) and (ii). Conditional on x or y being ranked first, it holds that
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)<rS(y, ω)}) = pS(x)
pS(x) + pS(y)
=
1
1 + pS(y)
pS(x)
(IIA)
=
1
1 +
p{x,y}(y)
p{x,y}(x)
=
p{x,y}(x)
p{x,y}(x) + p{x,y}(y)
= p{x,y}(x)
= P
({ω∈Ω | r{x,y}(x, ω)<r{x,y}(y, ω)}) .
Furthermore, in case (iii), we are left with n alternatives to rank from two to n.
Given that OC holds, the probabilities to be ranked second in this set correspond
to those of being ranked first in the set without z. This means, that both OC
and IIA hold in this set of n alternatives, and therefore by induction assumption,
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)<rS(y, ω)}) = P
({ω∈Ω | r{x,y}(x, ω)<r{x,y}(y, ω)}). Combin-
ing these arguments for the different cases finalizes the proof. 
5.3 Generalized order consistency proof
Proof. First, note that OC is a special case of property (4). Hence, it is left to
show that the property implies IoA. Consider two alternatives, x and y and their
order in pairwise comparison. Now note that, due to property (4), the addition of
new elements to the set will not change the relative order of x and y, which implies
that
P ({ω∈Ω | rS(x, ω)<rS(y, ω)}) = P
({ω∈Ω | r{x,y}(x, ω)<r{x,y}(y, ω)})
for arbitrary S. Therefore, IoA holds. 
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